This page provides an overview of my publications related to metaphysics, teleology, and agency, based on structural dual-aspect monism.
This article develops a stratified account of free will within a structural dual-aspect monism. The universe is treated as a single ontological ground manifesting both as physical structure and phenomenal interiority. Agency is analyzed across three levels: illusory freedom (deterministic unfolding), emergent freedom (self-organizing systems with internal modeling), and cosmic freedom (the universe’s intrinsic creativity expressed locally through agents). The model integrates determinism, autonomy, and ontological creativity into a unified metaphysical framework.
Holistic Emergence presents a structural dual‑aspect ontology in which biological organization actualizes the internal, proto‑phenomenal potential inherent in physical structure. The model rejects reductive physicalism, universal panpsychism, and functionalist accounts of mind. Instead, it proposes that phenomenality is neither ubiquitous nor reducible but emerges holistically when a physical structure becomes an integrated biological whole. This emergent phenomenality constitutes a phenomenal interior that grounds subjectivity, teleological direction, and agency. Holistic Emergence thereby provides the ontological basis for understanding purpose and free will as biological expressions of the internal aspect of structure.
This paper outlines a dual-aspect model of subjectivity and agency that rejects the standard division between libertarian free will, compatibilism, and mechanistic determinism. Living beings instantiate a single underlying substance with two inseparable aspects—physical and phenomenal. Subjectivity is the phenomenal interior of life itself, not an epiphenomenon of physical processes nor an independent mental substance. Within this framework, agency is the organism’s phenomenal expression of an immanent cosmic direction—teleonomy as the structural basis of teleology. Will is not free in the libertarian sense, nor reducible to mechanistic causation; it functions as the organism’s instrument for realizing intrinsic meaning. Drawing on Spinoza’s dual-aspect monism, Schopenhauer’s inner phenomenal force, Hans Jonas’s teleonomic biology, and contemporary emergence theory, the paper argues that a coherent, non-theistic, non-mechanistic account of agency is possible without invoking supernatural freedom or collapsing into reductive physicalism.
This article argues that David Skrbina’s The Metaphysics of Technology rests on a series of category errors: conflating intrinsic biological teleology with extrinsic technological function, misattributing purposiveness to non‑teleological systems, and reversing the ontological priority between life and technicity. Using a dual-aspect, orthogonality-based metaphysics, the article reconstructs an alternative in which technology is a contingent projection of biological cognition rather than a cosmic force.